

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

REPORT

INFORMATION REPORT

Jul 319

COUNTRY Yugoslavia

DATE DISTR. 2 November 1948

SUBJECT Conflicting Theories in Yugoslavia
on Tito-Moscow Rift

NO. OF PAGES 2

PLACE
ACQUIREDNO. OF ENCLS.
(LISTED BELOW)

50X1-HUM

DATE OF

SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE ACT 50 U.S.C. 31 AND 32, AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. REPRODUCTION OF THIS FORM IS PROHIBITED. HOWEVER, INFORMATION CONTAINED IN BODY OF THE FORM MAY BE UTILIZED AS DEEMED NECESSARY BY THE RECEIVING AGENCY.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION FOR THE RESEARCH
USE OF TRAINED INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS

50X1-HUM

1. Interpretation in "reactionary intellectual circles" in Yugoslavia of the Cominform-Tito rift varies. According to one theory the trouble is of long standing and arose from a conflict of opinion regarding the industrialization of Yugoslavia, the Soviets being desirous of restricting industrialization to a minimum and increasing agriculture and stock-raising to a maximum (along collective lines) with a view to the subsequent exchange of Yugoslav agricultural produce for Soviet manufactured goods.
2. Tito and certain other Yugoslav Communist leaders rejected this plan, since it made the country completely dependent upon the Soviet Union - apart from difficulties inherent in the introduction of collectivism in Yugoslavia.
3. According to another theory the main cause of the trouble between the Yugoslav Communists and Moscow lay in the relations between the Yugoslav and Soviet armies. The Russians have been trying in every way to strengthen their influence in the Yugoslav Army, and have indeed succeeded in winning over a considerable number of senior and junior officers, including political officers, to a pro-Soviet policy.
4. Matters, however, came to a head when General Sidorovich, Soviet Military Attache in Belgrade, on Tolbukhin's instructions, suggested to Tito that all posting of Yugoslav officers should be subject to Tolbukhin's approval. Tolbukhin was moreover to be allowed to transfer Yugoslav officers to the Red Army and Soviet officers to the Yugoslav Army. (Against this theory of a breach between the Yugoslav and Soviet Armed Forces is the fact that some 200 Yugoslav Air Force officers were sent from Zagreb to the USSR for training.)
5. According to the third theory (which is the one most persistently maintained) the quarrel is merely a game of bluff played by Tito and Moscow for the purpose of creating a state of affairs favorable for the forthcoming conflict between East and West, in which Yugoslavia, having supposedly fallen out with the other satellites of the Eastern bloc, would be justified - though still Communist - in remaining neutral.
6. Yugoslavia's neutrality would be of great benefit to Russia in shortening her operational front, apart from the threat Yugoslavia would represent to any Allied force that might be operating in the Danube basin.

CLASSIFICATION SECRET/CONTROL - U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY

| | | | | | | | | | |
|-------|------|------|--------------|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| STATE | NAVY | NSRB | DISTRIBUTION | | | | | | |
| ARMY | | | | | | | | | |

50X1-HUM

Page Denied